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CONGRESS AND THE PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHORITY:
FEDERAL SUPERVISION OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS
INTERSTATE compacts, at one time used primarily to formalize state boundary
settlements, have been employed increasingly to deal with problems requiring
continuing governmental attention.' Article I, section 10, clause 3 of the Con-
stitution provides that "No state shall, without the Consent of Congress ...
enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State. . . ." Congressional
involvement under this clause has normally been limited to reviewing the pro-
posed compact at the time of approval, and imposing conditions or reserva-
tions. Recently, however, the House of Representatives authorized the Com-
mittee of the Judiciary to investigate "activities and operations of interstate
compacts."'2 The Committee began its investigation by looking into the opera-
tions of the Port of New York Authority, the largest and most powerful of
the commissions created through interstate compacts. 3 Port Authority officials
1. See ZIMMERMANN & WENDELL, THE INTERSTATE COMPACT SINCE 1925, 3-29 (1951)
(hereinafter cited as ZIMMERMANN & WENDELL]. For a general discussion of the history
and development of interstate compacts, see Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause
of the Constitution-A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685 (1925) ; see
also LEACH & SUGG, THE ADMINISTRATION OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS (1959) [hereinafter
cited as LEACH & SUGG].
2. H.R. REs. 530, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), amending H.R. REs. 27, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1959). Congress had previously ordered a report from the U.S. Attorney Gen-
eral concerning activities of the commission which administers the Interstate Compact to
Conserve Oil and Gas. S.J. REs. 38, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
3. Created in 1921 by New York and New Jersey, the Authority was designed to
remedy the chaotic commercial conditions existing in the then-competing ports of New
York City and northern New Jersey. See BARD, THE PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHORITY
3-63 (1942); BIRD, A STUDY OF THE PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHORITY (1949). A more
abbreviated description of the Authority is Goldstein, The Port of New York Authority,
5 J. PuB. L. 408 (1956). Originally financed only by annual appropriations of $200,000,
PORT COMPACT, article XV, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:1-16 (1940), N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS
§ 6416, the Authority became self-supporting soon after its creation and has expanded until
its present assets total over one billion dollars, 1959 ANNUAL REPORT, THE PORT OF NEW
YORK AUTHORITY 71. Its present operations include the administration of
twenty-one terminal and transportation facilities; six interstate bridges and tunnels;
four air terminals and a heliport; six marine terminal areas; two union motor truck
terminals; a motor truck terminal for rail freight; and a union bus terminal.
Id. at v.
The Port Authority has been described as "perhaps the most efficiently run public
works agency in the world," FORTUNE, THE EXPLODING METROPOLIS 82 (1958). The factors
which lead to efficient operation of public authorities include their similarity to private
business institutions, their freedom from niches filled by political patronage, the flexibility
of action due to their recent origins, their financial independence from state legislatures,
exemption from certain restrictive constitutional provisions of state constitutions, and the
obligation of public service felt by the governing commissions. Some of these same factors
are pointed out by those arguing that independent authorities receive inadequate super-
vision. See text at notes 35-48 infra.
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complied with the Committee's requests for documents of a public nature, but,
acting pursuant to orders from the governors of New York and New Jersey,
they refused to submit documents dealing with the internal aspects of the
Authority's policy making processes. The officials were cited for contempt of
Congress by House resolutions, 4 and the Executive Director of the Port Au-
thority was charged with contempt through an information filed by the United
States Attorney for the District of Columbia. In deciding the latter case,
courts are faced for the first time with an assertion by Congress of the right
to investigate agencies created by interstate agreements.
The congressional right to investigate extends only as far as its legislative
powers. 6 The first question, therefore, is whether Congress has constitutional
power to legislate as to activities of interstate agencies.
Legislative authority might be based on a provision in the resolution con-
senting to the creation of the Port Authority which reserved to Congress the
right "to alter, amend or repeal" the terms of the compact.7 While Congress
can attach binding conditions to its consent,8 the compact clause should not be
interpreted to grant Congress legislative power over areas otherwise outside
its domain. Congress cannot by legislative act confer upon itself the constitu-
tional power to legislate.9 Alteration or amendment, therefore, would have to
be carried out pursuant to express and implied powers. Similarly, the right to
4. H.R. Rzs. 606, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 106 CONG. REc. 16059 (daily ed. Aug. 23, 1960)
(citing A. J. Tobin, Executive Director of the Port Authority) ; H.R. REP. No. 2117, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1960) ; H.R. REs. 607, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 106 CONG. REc. 16094 (daily
ed. Aug. 23, 1960) (citing J. G. Carty, Secretary of the Board of Commissioners of the
Port Authority) ; H.R. REP. No. 2121, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960); H.R. REs. 608, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess., 106 CONG. REc. 16098 (daily ed. Aug. 23, 1960) (citing S. S. Colt, Com-
missioner of the Port Authority) ; H.R. REzP. No. 2120, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
5. See United States Department of Justice, Press Release, Nov. 25, 1960. The Ex-
ecutive Director was charged under 52 Stat. 942 (1938), 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1959). Prior to
the filing of the information, the chairman of the Committee had argued that the U.S.
Attorney must obey the statutory instruction "to bring the matter before the grand jury
for its action." The Justice Department took the position that the procedure to be followed
rested within the discretion of the prosecutor. See Lewis, 3 on Port Board To Be Prose-
cuted, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1960, p. 1, col. 2.
6. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111-12 (1959) ; Quinn v. United States,
349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955). Only one case has set aside a contempt conviction because the
legislative purpose was unconstitutional. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1918)
(Congress has no "general power of making inquiry into the private affairs of the citi-
zen"). More recent decisions have undercut even this case by permitting investigations
notwithstanding exposure of an individual's private affairs, when a legislative purpose
otherwise appears. Barenblatt v. United States, supra at 134; United States v. Josephson,
165 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 838 (1948) ; see Note, 70 HARv. L. REv.
671, 672 (1957).
7. 42 Stat. 180 (1921).
8. Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 281 (1959); James v. Dravo
Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 148 (1937) (dictum).
9. Cf. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 161 (1926) ; Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559,
574 (1911). See also Note, 73 HARV. L. Rav. 1595, 1609 (1960).
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repeal must also be grounded on constitutional authority. In brief, the reserva-
tion clause itself is meaningless. 10
The first constitutional basis for legislative authority might be the compact
clause itself. It can be argued that the compact clause authorizes Congress not
only to withhold consent initially, but also to revoke consent once granted.:"
Revocation would be a form of legislation, presumably carrying with it a gen-
eral inquisitorial power. This argument assumes, of course, that the agreement
in question is a "compact or agreement" within the meaning of article I, sec-
tion 10. This assumption may not be valid in all cases. A frequently cited
dictum from the Supreme Court's opinion in Virginia v. Tennessee 12 states
that only those compacts tending "to the increase of political power in the
states, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the
United States" require congressional consent for their validity. State courts
have relied on this distinction in upholding unapproved interstate agreements
against challenges by private parties.1 Members of Congress have also espoused
the "political power" doctrine; a compact which established the Southern Re-
gion Education Board was referred to committee in 1948 for a determination
of whether the compact required congressional approval, and was finally put
into operation without approval.14 Indeed, many interstate agreements have
been put into operation without even seeking the assent of Congress.'5 While
the "political power" test is too vague to apply with any certainty, it is at least
possible that the Port Authority Compact, having no demonstrable effect on
the power of the contracting states vis-;t-vis the federal government, would
10. This has been recognized by Congress. In a conference committee report which
restored such a provision to a consent bill, the possibility of its being ineffectual was recog-
nized, but it was decided to retain the provision
if for no other reason than that Congress has been doing so in many instances for
some 47 years and omitting it from the legislation could give rise to the inference
that Congress is foreclosing itself from amending the act at some later date.
H.R. REP. No. 2234, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1957) ; see Louisville Bridge Co. v. United
States, 242 U.S. 409, 418 (1917) (right to amend legislation need not be expressly re-
served).
11. Since Congress has never attempted to revoke its consent to an interstate com-
pact, the legal consequences of such an action are not clear. Certainly a -bare resolution
withdrawing consent would create enormous confisibn in the Port Authority situation,
where the administration of a considerable- amount of valuable property is involved. But
see- Sanitary District v. United States, 266 U.S. 405, 431 (1925) ("The investment of
property izi the . . . works took the risk that Congress might render it valueless by the
exercise of paramount powers.").
12. 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893).
13. See Ham v. Maine-New Hampshire Bridge Authority, 92 N.H. 268, 30 A.2d 1
(1943) (interstate bridge agreement) ; Dixie Wholesale, Grocery, Inc. v. Martin, 278 Ky.
705, 129 S.W.2d 181, cert. denied, 308 U.S. 609 (1939) (administrative agreement). See
also State v. Lauridsen, 312 S.W.2d 140 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1958) (reciprocity statute) ; Landes
v. Landes, 1 N.Y. 2d 358, 153 N.Y.S.2d 14, 135 N.E.2d 562 (1956) (Uniform Support of
Dependents Law).
14. See ZIMMERMANN & WENDE.L 39-40.
15. Id. at 37.
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have been a valid enactment without congressional approval. The fact that Con-
gress has actually approved the compact does not compel the contrary conclu-
sion, for submission of a compact to Congress is a voluntary act of the states
concerned.
Commentators, recognizing the existence of many unapproved compacts,
have not denied that they are valid enactments. They maintain, however, that
all agreements between states are voidable-that Congress could invalidate
any interstate agreement by affirmative action.16 This view of "valid but void-
able" seems irreconcilable with the words of the compact clause. Since section
10 seems unequivocal in its prohibition of unapproved agreements, it seems
doubtful that an agreement can be valid without congressional consent and
yet still be a "compact or agreement" for purposes of congressional prohibition.
On the other hand, the "valid but voidable" interpretation may be the only
practical way of interpreting section 10 to achieve its purpose of preventing
conflict between these agreements and the interests of the federal government
and other states.' 7 Since serious conflicts may arise from agreements which do
not meet the "political" test, Congress must have plenary power to review
all.' 8 Yet to require actual review of every agreement would create an intoler-
able burden on both Congress and the enacting States.
Even if power under the compact clause were lacking, Congress might still
legislate under its enumerated powers. In view of the Port Authority's impact
on interstate commerce, there seems little doubt that Congress could legislate
in the area. The fact that the House Committee's enabling resolution refers
only to "interstate compacts" should not alter this conclusion. The resolution
does not name the specific congressional power on which it rests,'9 and since
the common meaning of "interstate compact" certainly includes the Port Au-
thority compact, the committee should be entitled to invoke any congressional
power which can support that command.
The fact of prior congressional approval of the Port Authority compact might
provide a second line of defense. In 1838, the Supreme Court interpreted con-
gressional consent under the compact clause as an act which restores states to
their original inherent sovereignty, so that agreements made in this manner
have "the same effect as a treaty between sovereign powers. ' '20 In theory, the
16. Id. at 40; Dunbar, Interstate Compacts and Congressional Consent, 36 VA. L.
REv. 753, 762 (1950) ; Comment, 45 YAM LJ. 324, 327-28 (1935). But see Note, 35 CoLum.
L. REv. 76, 84-85 (1935).
17. For discussion of the purpose of the clause, see Frankfurter & Landis,'sup'ra note
1, at 694-95. "
18. Ibid.
19. The general enabling resolution, H. R. REs. 27, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1960),
provides: "That the Committee on the Judiciary... is authorized and directed to conduct
... investigations and studies relating to the following matters coming within the juris-
diction of the committee, namely-[immigration laws, claims against the United States,
penal institutions, federal courts, antitrust laws, criminal statutes, and the submerged Lands
Act and Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act]."
20. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 724 (1838).
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compact stands as the act of an equal sovereign, unimpeachable by Congress.
Irrevocable consent is not unknown in the Constitution, for an analogy is found
in the admission of states into the Union.21 Presumably no one would maintain
that Congress could end the existence of thirty seven states by revoking its
consent to their admission. On the other hand, this ancient view would block
exercise of Congress' plenary powers in areas covered by interstate compacts.
And by failing to allow for changed circumstances, which might alter the im-
pact of the agreement, irrevocability of consent would also frustrate the pro-
tective purposes of the compact clause. The one commentator to suggest that
withdrawal of consent alone could not disturb the "treaty" has recognized
exceptions to this doctrine to provide for both these dangers; the compact can
be terminated if it conflicts with an exercise of plenary congressional power,
or if circumstances have changed. 22 The Port Authority charter would prob-
ably be revocable on both grounds, the second because the Authority has ac-
quired extensive additional powers since its inception in 1921 .23 A better ap-
proach would be to disregard the idea of irrevocability altogether. Since it must
be qualified practically out of existence by the "changed circumstances" excep-
tion, the concept serves only to introduce another false issue into the inter-
pretation of the compact clause.
The Authority challenges the congressional investigative power on still an-
other ground, arguing that documents pertaining to internal operations of an
agency performing state functions, created and regulated by the states, are
beyond the reach of congressional subpoena. 24 Both state and federal courts
have regarded the Port Authority as a state agency for a variety of purposes,
such as exemption from municipal taxation of its realty,25 from federal taxation
of the interest on its bonds 26 from the operation of local ordinances, 27 and
from restrictions placed on private persons by state laws.28 In addition, the
21. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 3. See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567 (1911); Mora
v. Torres, 113 F. Supp. 309 (D.P.R. 1953) (Congress cannot unilaterally amend agree-
ment with Puerto Rico "in the nature of a compact").
22. Note, 35 CoLum. L. REv. 76, 84-85 (1935).
23. See note 3 supra.
24. See Brief in Support of Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, pp. 28-60, United
States v. Tobin, Cr. No. 986-60 (D.D.C. 1960).
25. Port of New York Authority v. Union City, 19 N.J. Misc. 421, 20 A.2d 653 (Sup.
Ct. 1941); Bush Terminal Co. v. New York, 282 N.Y. 306, 26 N.E.2d 269 (1940) (by
implication).
26. Commissioner v. Shamberg's Estate, 144 F.2d 998, 1004 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 792 (1944). See also Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938).
27. Port of New York Authority v. Weehawken, 27 N.J. Super. 328, 99 A.2d 317
(Super. Ct. 1953).
28. Port of New York Authority v. J. E. Linde Paper Co., 205 Misc. 110, 127 N.Y.S.2d
155 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1953) ("The Port Authority . . . is immune from the unilateral




Port Authority has been held entitled to sovereign immunity.29 The federal
government itself has provided grant-in-aid funds to the Port Authority under
provisions allocating such monies to "states." 30°
But even if the Authority is an agency of the states, such a status would not
immunize its files from congressional investigation. In addition to the pre-
emptive effect of federal legislation upon conflicting state enactments, the
powers of Congress probably extend to regulation, and therefore investigation,
of state agencies themselves.31 The Supreme Court has held a state-operated
railway subject to criminal penalties when the trains were operated in violation
of a federal statute, even though the railway was "acting within a power
reserved to the states." 32 The theory that state documents are sacrosanct when
dealing with wholly internal matters was recently rejected. In re Wallace 83
involved an attempt by the Civil Rights Commission to inspect voting records
of the state of Alabama. State election officials had not responded to a court
order, and a motion was filed in the District Court for an order to enforce
compliance. The state officials claimed, inter alia, that examination by federal
officials constituted an illegal invasion of state sovereignty. Insisting that its
order be obeyed, the court held that
the sovereignty of the State of Alabama, or any other of the states, must
yield ... to this expression of Congress... passed in a proper exercise of
a power specifically delegated to the Federal Government.3 4
Congressional investigation of interstate agencies such as the Port Authority
may be desirable in view of their relative freedom from both state and federal
regulation.3r States take the initiative in creating these agencies, and assume
responsibility for their direction and control. Opportunity for regulation is
afforded by usual controls such as the appropriations power, the appointment
29. Voorhis v. Cornell Contracting Corp., 170 Misc. 908, 912, 10 N.Y.S.2d 378, 381
(N.Y. City Ct. 1938) ; Howell v. Port of New York Authority, 34 F. Supp. 797 (D.N.J.
1940). But cf. Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 283 (1959)
(concurring opinion) (dictum) (applicability of Eleventh Amendment to bistate agencies
an open question).
30. E.g., Federal Airport Act, 60 Stat. 170 (1946), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1101-19 (1958) ; see
1952 ANxuAL REPORT, THE PORT OF NEW YORK AUTTHORIY 85. On occasion, a distinction
is made between state and bistate agencies. E.g., 69 Stat. 643 (1955), 42 U.S.C. § 1492(a)
(1958); 70 Stat. 1044 (1956), 43 U.S.C. § 422(b), -(c) (1958). The Port Authority's
dealings with the federal government are in the nature of arms length transactions. See
Goldstein, The Port of New York Authority, 5 J. PuB. L. 408, 411-12 (1956) ; 1959 AN-
NUAL REPORT, PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHORITY 45.
31. Investigation is not regulation, ICC v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194, 211
(1912), but the power to regulate implies a power to investigate, Oklahoma Press Publish-
ing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 210 (1946).
32. United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 183-84 (1935) ; see Stern, The Coin-
merce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 H, v. L. REv. 645, 663 (1946).
33. 170 F. Supp. 63 (M.D. Ala. 1959).
34. Id. at 67.
35. For discussion of state restraints with respect to the Port Authority, see BAR,
THE PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHORITY 269-7? (1942).
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power, and gubernatorial veto.36 But because of the compact agency's unfamil-
iar character and lack of integration into the state administrative structure,
little control is imposed in practice.37 Moreover, modification of existing policy
may be hindered by the need for joint action of two or more state legislatures.38
Nor can judicial control be relied upon to protect the national interest. Where-
as both state and federal courts take responsibility for weighing the burden of
state legislation on interstate commerce,3 9 they appear to be reluctant to engage
in an analogous examination of the national interest when an interstate compact
is involved. Holding that 1951 legislation modifying a 1921 interstate compact
was necessarily "congressionally approved," one court has refused even to ex-
amine the legislation to see if it fell within the scope of the consent given by
Congress.
40
Existing congressional controls over interstate agencies are of little or no
regulatory importance. Congress does not usually have the power to block ap-
pointments 41 or control appropriations, devices which give it at least some con-
trol over federal agencies. Congressional restraints include various reservation
clauses,42 consent of limited duration,43 restrictions on further state legislation
without congressional approval,44 requirements of periodic reports to Con-
gress, 45 and the right to examine books and records.46 These are inefficient
tools for initiating affirmative national policy guides. 47 Moreover, since inter-
36. LEAcHr & SuGG at 25-49.
37. Ibid.
38. THURSBY, INTERSTATE COOPERATION 13-14 (1953); Clark, Interstate Compacts
and Social Legislation, 51 POL. ScI. Q. 36 (1936).
39. E.g., Southern Pac. R.R. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Williams v. Stockham
Valves & Fittings Inc., 213 Ga. 713, 101 S.E.2d 197 (1957), rev'd, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
40. Wolkstein v. Port of New York Authority, 178 F. Supp. 209, 213 (D.N.J. 1959).
No court has ever invalidated an interstate agreement on any grounds. One factor which
may cause greater judicial deference when dealing with interstate compacts is the state
courts' awareness that their decisions will affect relations with other states. See, e.g., Com-
monwealth ex rel. Smith v. Clark, 331 Pa. 405, 415, 200 At. 41, 46 (1938).
41. In at least one case, however, Congress has provided that the President appoint
commissioners to represent the interests of the United States. Ohio River Valley Water
Sanitation Compact, article XI, § 3, 54 Stat. 756 (1940).
42. E.g., 65 Stat. 671 (1951).
43. Interstate Compact to Conserve Oil and Gas, 49 Stat. 941 (1935); Atlantic States
Marine Fisheries Compact, 56 Stat. 267 (1942).
44. Bi-State Development Agency Compact, 64 Stat. 571 (1950).
45. Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Compact, 56 Stat. 270 (1942); Pacific Marine
Fisheries Compact, 61 Stat. 422 (1947).
46. New York-New Jersey Transportation Agency Compact, 73 Stat. 582 (1959);
Wabash Valley Compact, 73 Stat. 699 (1959). All of these conditions are, of course, sub-
ject to a determination of their constitutionality.
47. A lack of specific policy direction is especially clear when Congress consents to
compacts before they are written. See ZIMMERMANN & WENDELL 91-92. Most consent-in-
advance statutes are simply congressional encouragement of interstate cooperation. Id. at
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state compact agencies are primarily identified with the state governments,
congressional attention to these agencies is likely to be sporadic at best.
48
Investigation may be required, therefore, both to evaluate the need for sup-
plementary legislation and to impose more subtle controls on agency officials.
But a countervailing argument suggests that Congress should use its investi-
gating powers sparingly. Interstate agreements often deal with multistate prob-
lems which might otherwise be considered the responsibility of the federal
government. State officials who negotiate interstate agreements are frequently
aware of this fact, and may be induced to act, in part, by a desire to preserve
traditional state authority over the problem area. 49 The prospect of increased
federal interference could thus have a strong inhibitory effect on interstate
cooperation. If it does, the national interest may be harmed on balance, for any
reduction in state action will ultimately lead to demands for increases in federal
activity and expenditures.5 0
In addition to denying congressional investigative power, defendant in the
Port Authority case also argues that he was prevented from complying with
the subpoena by the orders of his superiors.5 1 The governors of both New York
and New Jersey directed the commissioners under their respective jurisdictions
to order the three officials involved not to produce certain of the subpoenaed
documentsY2 In some contempt of court cases, this defense has been allowed.
When subordinate officials in executive and independent agencies of the federal
government have refused to respond to subpoenas of litigants seeking infor-
mation for use in private lawsuits, 53 the regulations forbidding disclosure of
governmental materials without specific release from higher authority have been
held to protect such subordinates from being cited for contempt of court. 4
Allowance of the subordinates' defense in these cases is not based on a finding
that the government has a right to withhold the information. That issue would
be tested if the superior himself were subpoenaed. Rather, it rests on a policy
48. See LEACH & SUGG 56.
49. For an example of this attitude, see id. at 196 (Interstate Compact to Conserve Oil
and Gas).
50. The increasing need for joint action has often been pointed out. Commisslox oN
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS REPORT 45-47 (New Jersey 1955); Hart, The Relations
between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 542 (1954). See also Fordham,
Decision-Making in Expanding American Urban Life, 21 OHIo ST. L.J. 274, 281 (1960).
51. See Brief in Support of Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, pp. 98-110, United
States v. Tobin, Cr. No. 986-60 (D.D.C. 1960).
52. The letters ordering the commissioners to refrain from producing the documents
are reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 2120, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 39-41 (1960).
53. When the government is a party, recognition of the binding effect of departmental
regulations prohibiting production of documents will not prejudice the opposing litigant,
for the government may be compelled to sacrifice its lawsuit as a price for secrecy. Andol-
shek v. United States, 142 F.2d 503, 506 (2d Cir. 1944).
54. United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1950) ; Appeal of SEC, 226
F.2d 501 (6th Cir. 1955). Whether the highest officials of the executive branch of the
federal government have constitutional power to withhold information from Congress or
the courts has never been decided. Bishop, The Executive's Right of Privacy: .4t Un-
resolved Constitutional Question, 66 YALE L.J. 477 (1957).
1961]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
of preserving an orderly scheme of access to governmental documents. The
defense has been justified on the grounds that the protection of private parties
demands that no information be released except as directed by the official
ultimately responsible for the effect of the governmental action ;r, that great
confusion would result if freedom to search through files were given ;51 and
simply that the prohibitory regulation has the force of law.57 Although seldom
mentioned, another reason for allowing the "superior order" defense may be a
subordinate's plight when subject to conflicting orders.58 Because of these con-
siderations, it is not unreasonable to require the litigant seeking governmental
information to proceed against the superior officer himself.
If this defense were allowed in the Port Authority case, Congress could
compel production of the information only by acting directly against the Ex-
ecutive Director's superiors, either the Port Authority Commissioners or the
governors themselves. 59 But some of the considerations underlying recognition
of the defense in private lawsuits may not be applicable when Congress is the
party seeking information. Arguably, the interest of Congress in direct and
speedy access to information is greater than that of a private litigant. More-
over, recognizing a congressional right of access would not have the disruptive
effect of allowing a multitude of private litigants to roam through Port Au-
thority files. 60 Of course, the Executive Director is in no less a dilemma than
any other official confronted with conflicting orders. But even this difficulty
is probably erased by the fact that the subordinate can probably plead the
supremacy of the federal order as a defense to any disciplinary action taken
by state officials.61
55. Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459, 469-70 (1899).
56. Id. at 470.
57. Ex parte Sackett, 74 F2d 922, 924 (9th Cir. 1935).
58. See United States v. Hall, 153 F. Supp. 661, 666 (W.D. Ky. 1957).
59. Congress has, of course, already cited one commissioner for contempt, see note 4
supra, but no court action has been taken.
60. Documents of a public nature are probably available to anyone. N.Y. Post Corp.
v. Moses, 210 N.Y.S.2d 88 (App. Div. 1961).
61. A further weakness of the "superior order" defense in the present case is the possi-
bility that the order not to produce documents was not valid. It is unclear whether the
governors' orders are binding on the Authority officials. Although article XVI of the com-
pact reserves to each state the right to provide for the exercise of a veto power by the
governor over "actions" of a "commissioner" appointed from his state, PORT AUTHORITY
CompACT, article XVI, N.J. STAT. ANN. 32:1-17 (1940), N.Y. UNCONSoL. LAws § 6417,
the "action" in article XVI seems to refer to actions taken and voted on at regular meet-
ings of the commissioners. One possible interpretation of the compact, therefore, is that
the veto power was meant to apply only to affirmative actions taken by the commissioners
themselves, such as approving a proposed project or acquisition of property, 1942 Ops.
N.Y. ATrVY GEN. 390. This interpretation is supported by the fact that article VII of the
compact provides for imposition of additional duties on the commissioners only by joint
legislative action, PORT AUTHORITY COMPACT, article VII, N.J. STAT. ANN. 32:1-8, N.Y.
UNCONSoL. LAWS § 6408. On the other hand, defendant points out that the veto powers of
the governors could properly have been invoked if the commissioners had first gone through
the formality of voting to furnish the information to Congress. Brief in Support of Motion
for Judgment of Acquittal, pp. 107-08, United States v. Tobin, Cr. No. 986-60 (D.D.C.
1960).
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